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Abstract
To not harm others is widely considered the most basic element of human morality. The aversion to harm others can be
either rooted in the outcomes of an action (utilitarianism) or reactions to the action itself (deontology). We speculated that the
human moral judgments rely on the integration of neural computations of harm and visceral reactions. The present
research examined whether utilitarian or deontological aspects of moral judgment are associated with cardiac vagal tone, a
physiological proxy for neuro-visceral integration. We investigated the relationship between cardiac vagal tone and moral
judgment by using a mix of moral dilemmas, mathematical modeling and psychophysiological measures. An index of bipo-
lar deontology-utilitarianism was correlated with resting heart rate variability (HRV)—an index of cardiac vagal tone—such
that more utilitarian judgments were associated with lower HRV. Follow-up analyses using process dissociation, which in-
dependently quantifies utilitarian and deontological moral inclinations, provided further evidence that utilitarian (but not
deontological) judgments were associated with lower HRV. Our results suggest that the functional integration of neural and
visceral systems during moral judgments can restrict outcome-based, utilitarian moral preferences. Implications for theo-
ries of moral judgment are discussed.
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To not harm others is widely considered the most basic element
of human morality (Cushman et al., 2006; Haidt, 2007; Gray et al.,
2012). There is substantial evidence highlighting the role that
aversion to harm plays in moral judgments (Blair, 1995;
Cushman et al., 2012; Crockett, 2013; Schein and Ward, 2014).
Such harm aversion can arise either from thinking about the
outcome caused by a specific action—not pushing the person on
the tracks which will cause five people to die—or by the action
itself—pushing a person on the tracks (Crockett, 2013;
Cushman, 2013). While harm aversion evoked by outcomes is a
result of cognitive computations mediated by brain structures,
such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal
lobes (Greene et al., 2004), harm aversion evoked by actions is
rooted in visceral reactions of the autonomic nervous system
(see Blair, 1995). Harmful actions cause immediate physiological
reactions that lead people to judge such actions as morally
wrong regardless of outcomes (Cushman et al., 2012). In this
paper, we examine the relationship between these different
forms of harm aversion and a physiological index of neuro-
visceral integration.
In practice, moral judgments are most often a compromise
between action-based and outcome-based considerations
(Kahane, 2015). This raises the question of how cognitive com-
putations about outcomes and visceral reactions evoked by
harmful actions are integrated into moral judgment (Moll et al.,
2008; Kvaran and Sanfey, 2010; Nucci and Gingo, 2010). We
speculated that cardiac vagal tone might help address this issue
since it has been linked to neuro-visceral integration during
cognitive and emotional regulation (Friedman, 2007; Thayer and
Lane, 2009; Park and Thayer, 2014). Specifically, we examined
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whether outcome-based (utilitarianism) or action-based (de-
ontology) moral judgment would be associated with the ability
to integrate visceral reactions into judgment—indexed by car-
diac vagal tone.
Harm aversion and moral judgment
Aversion to moral actions based on outcomes describes the idea
that people judge an action as morally wrong because of the
anticipated consequences. A policeman, for instance, might feel
that shooting a perpetrator is justified because it will prevent
the death of several innocent people. Outcome-based aversion
has been linked to deliberation (Greene and Haidt, 2002) or
model-based learning (Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013). On sacri-
ficial dilemmas where people must decide whether to sacrifice
one person to save more, for instance, people might deliberately
imagine the anticipated outcomes of each of the possible ac-
tions (e.g. pushing the stranger of the footbridge or not) for the
people involved (Kahane, 2015). Then, based on their empath-
etic reactions to these imagined outcomes, they would judge
the proposed action (i.e. pushing the stranger onto the train
racks to save the life of five strangers) as either permissible or
not. Consistently, outcome-based processes have been linked to
cognitive computations about utility. And studies that either
manipulate or measure individual differences in deliberation
find a link between outcome-based decisions and deliberation
(e.g. Nichols and Mallon, 2006; Bartels, 2008; Greene et al., 2008;
Moore et al., 2008; Conway and Gawronski, 2013). However, re-
cent studies suggest that outcome-based decisions can be based
on a lack of visceral or emotional responses to committing
harm (Koenigs et al., 2007; Bartels and Pizarro, 2011).
Action-based harm aversion, in contrast, refers to the idea
that people judge an action as morally wrong based on the dis-
like for a particular action, independent of the consequences. A
policeman, for instance, might feel that shooting a perpetrator
is wrong because of his aversion of shooting someone, not be-
cause of his aversion of the outcome (i.e. death of the perpetra-
tor). Action aversion implies that people judge certain actions
as wrong not because of their consequences or their concern for
another person. Victimless ‘crimes’ such as cleaning a toilet
with a national flag, however, provide examples for moral judg-
ments that do not appear to be dependent on harmful outcomes
(Haidt et al., 1993; but see Gray and Keeney, 2015). Similarly, par-
ticipants perceived actions such as stabbing somebody with a
fake knife as aversive even though the action had no aversive
outcomes (Cushman et al., 2012). Furthermore, self-rated aver-
sion to such harmless actions is a better predictor of moral judg-
ments on sacrificial moral dilemmas than self-rated aversion to
outcomes (Miller et al., 2014). Thus, people seem to base their
moral judgments largely on the aversion to performing certain
actions.
Action- and outcome-based aversion to actions have been
linked to two philosophical traditions: deontology and utilitar-
ianism (Hume, 1739/1978; Kant, 1785/1983; Crockett, 2013;
Cushman, 2013). Deontology promotes rule-based morality by
focusing on rights and duties whereas utilitarianism focuses on
the impartial concern for a greater good as the best outcome,
even at personal sacrifices (Kant, 1785/1983; Kahane et al., 2015).
Deontological ethics have been linked to action-based harm-
aversion, leading to one’s resistance to cause personal harm to
another person in sacrificial moral dilemmas (e.g. footbridge di-
lemma; Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008). In contrast, utilitarian
ethics have been linked to outcome-based harm aversion and
the willingness to harm few to save more people in moral
dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008). In line with the vast
majority of research on moral judgments, we refer to action-
based judgments as deontological, and outcome-based ones as
utilitarian. However, it is important to note that both, deontol-
ogy and utilitarianism, represent extreme philosophical pos-
itions, and human morality might be better described as a
mixture of both outcome- and action-based judgments
(Kahane, 2015).
Action-based harm aversion is often associated with physio-
logical threat and stress indicators, such as total peripheral re-
sistance (Mendes et al., 2007). People, for instance, show
stronger physiological aversion to performing harmless actions
(e.g. hitting a rubber hand with a hammer) compared with view-
ing somebody else performing the same actions (Cushman
et al., 2012). Furthermore, such physiological reactions to stress
predict responses on sacrificial moral dilemma, the stronger the
threat response, the more people prefer deontological judg-
ments (Cushman et al., 2012). Accordingly, people with reduced
awareness of their physiological states (i.e. alexithymia) make
utilitarian judgments (Patil and Silani, 2014). People potentially
acquire such physiological reactions via learning; the repeated
pairing of a suffering person (an unconditioned aversive stimu-
lus) with a specific action might lead to an automatic aversive
response (Blair, 1995). Yet, we know very little about the physio-
logical processes that indicate the extent to which visceral re-
sponses are integrated into moral judgments.
HRV and neuro-visceral integration
According to the neuro-visceral integration model, cardiac vagal
tone—that reflects activity of vagus nerve in the heart—
mediates the relationship between cardiac autonomic function
and neural circuits implicated in cognitive, social and emo-
tional regulation (Task Force of the European Society of
Cardiology and the North American Society of Pacing and
Electrophysiology, 1996; Berntson et al., 1997; Thayer and Lane,
2000, 2009; Park and Thayer, 2014). The vagus nerve is the 10th
cranial nerve that innervates a number of peripheral (visceral)
organs such as the heart, the lungs, the stomach and the liver
(Berntson et al., 1997). Through afferent and efferent pathways
of the vagus nerve, the brain can exchange information with
visceral organs such as the heart and reciprocally influence
activities to meet situational demands (Berntson et al., 1997;
Thayer and Lane, 2000; Porges, 2003). Specifically, the vagus
nerve provides inhibitory inputs to the heart via the parasym-
pathetic nervous system to regulate cardiac activity in accord-
ance with the situation (Thayer and Lane, 2000; see also Porges,
2003). Although the heart is innervated by both the sympathetic
and the parasympathetic nervous systems, greater tonic inhibi-
tory control of the parasympathetic nervous system permits en-
ergy conservation in the cardiac autonomic function (Thayer
and Lane, 2000; see also Porges, 2003).
Greater cardiac vagal tone—indexed by higher resting heart
rate variability (HRV)—reflects highly integrated neuro-visceral
systems (Thayer and Lane, 2000, 2009; Park and Thayer, 2014).
Therefore, higher HRV reflects robust regulation of the heart via
the vagus nerve and is often associated with effective self-
regulatory functioning (Park and Thayer, 2014). This allows for
making flexible and adaptive responses to meet environmental
needs (Thayer and Lane, 2000; Thayer et al., 2009). Conversely,
reduced cardiac vagal tone—low resting HRV—is associated
with difficulty in integrating neuro-visceral systems that results
in a trouble to inhibit an automatic response and recruiting ex-
ecutive function—mediated by the prefrontal cortex—to
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successfully master the task at hand (Johnson et al., 2003; Park
and Thayer, 2014). Similar results have been reported for experi-
mental task probing the procession of fearful faces (Park et al.,
2012a), inhibitory control and selective attention (Park et al.,
2012b, 2013a), as well as attentional control (Park et al., 2013b).
Thus, cardiac vagal tone might also indicate the extent to which
visceral reactions associated with action aversion are integrated
into moral judgments.
This idea is also in line with the psychophysiology of moral
judgment. Specifically, participants with damage to the ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) are less likely to endorse de-
ontological moral judgments (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs
et al., 2007; Moretto et al., 2010). The vmPFC is the key region for
integrating values into decision-making (Hare et al., 2010; Hunt
et al., 2012) and plays a key role in moral judgment (see Greene
and Haidt, 2002; Van Bavel et al., 2015). The regulatory input of
the cardiac vagal tone on emotional responses has also been
related to neural activity in the vmPFC (Lane et al., 2009; Thayer
et al., 2012), suggesting that cardiac vagal tone and the vmPFC
are part of the same regulatory system implicated in integrating
visceral responses into moral judgments.
Overview
In the current research, we examined whether resting cardiac
vagal tone is associated with moral judgment. We suggest that
cardiac vagal tone may indicate the extent to which visceral
systems associated with action aversion are integrated into
neural systems. A failure of the integration might result in
strong utilitarian tendencies. Previous research has shown that
strong deontological moral judgments stem from visceral
reactions—indexed by peripheral vasoconstriction/total periph-
eral resistance—to perform certain actions (Cushman et al.,
2012). Thus, making deontological moral judgments may not re-
quire neuro-visceral integration. To make moral judgments
which represent non-extreme philosophical positions, harm
aversion needs to be balanced with outcome-based consider-
ations mediated primarily by the prefrontal cortex, which may
depend on one’s capacity to integrate visceral reactions into
judgment. However, an inability to integrate visceral reactions
into moral judgment might lead to strong outcome-based, utili-
tarian judgments, similar to research on people with vmPFC
damage (e.g. Koenigs et al., 2007). Previous research has linked
reduced cardiac vagal tone to difficulty in integrating neuro-
visceral systems (Thayer and Lane, 2000; Thayer et al., 2009;
Park and Thayer, 2014). Thus, lower vagal tone would predict
stronger utilitarian tendencies.
Furthermore, previous research has found that psychopathic
tendencies correlate with utilitarian judgments (e.g. Bartels and
Pizarro, 2011), and people with antisocial and psychopathic
traits have lower cardiac vagal tone (Raine, 1997; Hansen et al.,
2007). Therefore, a failure to integrate visceral harm aversion
into moral judgments might increase utilitarian judgment.
Based on these findings, one might expect that lower vagal tone
would be associated with stronger utilitarian tendencies on sac-
rificial moral dilemmas.
Previous research with moral dilemmas has often con-
founded utilitarian and deontological tendencies. For instance,
the tendency to endorse utilitarian judgments on sacrificial di-
lemmas might either be due to strong outcome-based, utilitar-
ian tendencies or a lack of action-based, deontological
tendencies. In order to disentangle the underlying processes,
Conway and Gawronski (2013) recently adapted the process dis-
sociation (PD) procedure to independently quantify utilitarian
and deontological tendencies during moral judgment. Research
employing this approach found that the utilitarian PD param-
eter was associated with the need for cognition and cognitive
capacity, whereas the deontological PD parameter was associ-
ated with empathic concern (Conway and Gawronksi, 2013).
Hence, by examining if either the deontological or utilitarian PD
is associated with vagal tone, we can isolate the precise rela-
tionship between cardiac vagal tone and moral decision-
making.
Methods
Participants
Sixty-four undergraduate students at Azusa Pacific University
(38 women; mean age¼ 19.4) successfully completed the experi-
ment for partial course credit.1 All participants were identified
as non-smokers and were asked to refrain from alcohol, drug
use and caffeinated beverages for 4 h prior to participation
(Hansen et al., 2003; Park et al., 2012a, b). People with a history of
neurological or psychiatric disorders, cardiovascular disorders
or medical conditions such as diabetes were excluded from this
experiment. Participants were of diverse ethnicity: 22.7%
Latino(a)/Hispanic, 53% Caucasian/non-Hispanic White, 13.6%
Asian/Asian American, 1.5% African American and 6.1% Other.
Procedure
All participants were tested individually in a dimly lit room.
Participants were fitted with the chest band. After confirming
that inter-beat intervals (IBIs) were being recorded in the watch
(which displays beat-to-beat changes in HR), the experimenter
moved the watch away from the participant’s gaze. A stopwatch
was used to time successive 5-min intervals, during which the
participant sat and rested quietly in a partially sound isolated
room. After the 5-min baseline period, participants were pre-
sented with the moral judgment task. In the task, participants
read and responded to a series of moral dilemmas. After reading
each dilemma, participants were asked to indicate whether the
described action would be appropriate or inappropriate. The
moral dilemmas and the questions about the appropriateness
of the relevant action were presented consecutively on the
same screen. Dilemmas were presented in a fixed random
order. Then, on the next slide, participants were asked to indi-
cate how difficult it was for them to reach a decision on 5-point
scale ranging from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult). Difficulty per-
ception was measured for each dilemma separately. After the
task, participants went through a 5-min recovery period. After
the recovery period, participants completed several
questionnaires.2
We then assessed a series of individual differences used in
previous PD research to help validate our approach. We meas-
ured religiosity using the Duke University Religion Index (DUREL;
Koenig et al., 1997), which consists of 5 items (a¼ 0.88, M¼ 21.61,
s.d.¼ 4.86). We also measured empathy (a¼ 0.64, M¼ 27.57,
s.d.¼ 3.55) and perspective-taking (a¼ 0.80, M¼ 25.61, s.d.¼ 4.39)
1 The behavioral and cardiovascular data from three participants were
lost due to equipment failure and a computer error. We excluded three
participant whose PD utilitarian score is 0, which is suggested by
Conway and Gawronski (2013). According to G*Power (Faul et al., 2007),
the sample size of 64 was proposed to detect medium effects of about q
¼ 0.30.
2 The questionnaire data from eight participants were lost due to equip-
ment failure and failure to complete questionnaires.
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using two subscales of Davis’s (1983) interpersonal reactivity
index (IRI), and need for cognition (a¼ 0.69, M¼ 34.23, s.d.¼ 4.91)
and faith in intuition (a¼ 0.86, M¼ 34.23, s.d.¼ 4.91) using a short
version of Epstein et al.’s (1996) rational-experiential inventory.
Participants’ self-concept as a moral person was measured
using the moral identity internalization (a¼ 0.67, M¼ 48.41,
s.d.¼ 18.27) scale developed by Aquino and Reed (2002). All ma-
terials (including a full list of moral dilemmas) are available on-
line at https://osf.io/dvc2h/.
Materials
Moral dilemmas. We adopted a series of moral dilemmas from a
previously published set (Conway and Gawronski, 2013). Each
dilemma depicted participants as actors who must choose
whether or not to take a harmful action to achieve a particular
outcome. There were 10 moral dilemmas in total, each of which
was presented in both congruent and incongruent versions. In
congruent dilemmas, the outcomes of harmful actions were
described as more harmful than beneficial. In this case, people
might consider harmful action as acceptable to prevent the un-
desired event from occurring, but it cannot be considered un-
acceptable by either deontological or utilitarian perspectives. In
incongruent dilemmas, the outcomes of harmful action were
described as more beneficial than harmful, thereby directly
placing deontological and utilitarian views in conflict.
As can be seen in Figure 1, there are three paths in which
moral judgments are delivered: (a) utilitarianism ultimately
drives the response, represented by U (top path), (b) deontology
ultimately drives the response, represented by D (middle path)
and (c) neither utilitarianism, represented by 1  U, nor deontol-
ogy, represented by 1  D, drives the response (bottom path). In
congruent dilemmas, the probability of making unacceptable
responses to harm occurs when both utilitarianism (U) and de-
ontology (D) drive the responses, which is algebraically repre-
sented as: (i) p(unacceptablejcongruent)¼Uþ [(1  U)3D]. The
probability of making acceptable responses occurs when neither
utilitarianism (1  U) nor deontology (1 – D) drive the responses,
which is represented as: (ii) p(acceptablejcongruent)¼ (1 
U)3 (1  D). The same logic applies to the incongruent di-
lemmas. In incongruent dilemmas, the probability of making
unacceptable responses occurs when deontology drives the re-
sponse and when utilitarianism does not drive the response,
which is algebraically represented as: (iii) p(unacceptablejincon-
gruent)¼ (1 – U)3D. The probability of making acceptable re-
sponses occurs when utilitarianism drives the response and (b)
neither deontology nor utilitarianism drives the response,
which is represented as: (iv) p(acceptablejincongruent)¼Uþ [(1
 U)3 (1  D)]. Two parameters representing deontology (D) and
utilitarianism (U) can be computed using these equations. For
example, U can be obtained by subtracting Equation (3) from
Equation (1): (5) U¼ p(unacceptablejcongruent)  p(unaccept-
ablejincongruent). D can be computed by: (6) p(unacceptablejin-
congruent)j(1  U). As such, PD algebraically derives two
parameters that are independently assessing the strength of de-
ontology and utilitarianism, respectively, based on participants’
responses to both congruent and incongruent dilemmas (see
Figure 1 for a processing tree; Conway and Gawronski, 2013;
Friesdorf et al., 2015).
Physiological measurements
HRV can be measured in several time and frequency methods
(Task Force of the European Society of Cardiology and the North
American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology, 1996). Simple
time-domain measures of HRV can be directly derived from the
IBI time series and include (i) the standard deviation of the time
series, (ii) the square root of the mean of squared successive IBI
differences [root mean square successive differences (RMSSD)
or mean successive differences (MSD)] and (iii) the percentage
of differences between consecutive IBIs that are greater than
50 ms (pNN50). In the frequency domain methods, the HR time
series is decomposed into its frequency components, which
then can be described in terms of a spectral density function
that provides the distribution of power as a function of fre-
quency (Task Force of the European Society of Cardiology and
the North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology,
1996; Berntson et al., 1997; Thayer and Friedman, 2004). The
high frequency power (HFP) of HRV ranges from 0.15 to 0.4 Hz
and is exclusively mediated by the vagus nerves (Task Force of
the European Society of Cardiology and the North American
Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology, 1996; Thayer and
Fig. 1. Processing tree that illustrate the components leading to moral judgments that harmful action is either acceptable or unacceptable in congruent and incongru-
ent moral dilemmas. This figure is taken from Conway and Gawronski (2013; Reproduced with permission of authors and publisher).
P. Gewnhi et al. | 1591
Friedman, 2004). The low frequency band ranges from 0.04 to
0.15 and is thought to reflect both sympathetic and vagal modu-
lation on cardiac activity (Task Force of the European Society of
Cardiology and the North American Society of Pacing and
Electrophysiology, 1996; Thayer et al., 1996; Berntson et al., 1997;
Thayer and Friedman, 2004). High frequency HRV power and
RMSSD are considered to effectively quantify vagal activity
(Task Force of the European Society of Cardiology and the North
American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology, 1996; Thayer
et al., 1996; Buchheit et al., 2007). In this experiment, to investi-
gate the extent to which visceral and neural systems are inte-
grated in making moral judgment, we used RMSSD as the
primary measure of HRV as it is less affected by respiration
(Penttila et al., 2001; Park et al., 2013a).
In this research, a Polar RS800cx HR monitor (Polar Electro,
Finland; www.polar.fi) was used to record electrocardiographic
activity (Park et al., 2012c). The RS800cx is a portable heart rate
(HR) monitor tool that is sampled at 1000 Hz, which yields time-
and frequency-domain estimates of HRV comparable to those
obtained via standard 3- or 12-electrode ECG setups (e.g.
Vanderlei et al., 2008; Nunan et al., 2009). In the RS800cx, partici-
pants wore an elastic band around the chest, just below the
sternum. A sensor was attached to the elastic band that de-
tected R spikes and transmitted an infrared signal to the watch,
which recorded the time of each R spike. Successive IBIs (in ms)
within the baseline period were written in a single text file and
analyzed using the Kubios HRV analysis package 2.0 (http://bas
mig.uku.fk/biosignal) through which time and frequency do-
main indices of the heart period power spectrum were com-
puted. The Kubios software provides spectral estimates based
upon the more modern autoregressive algorithm that has nu-
merous advantages over the fast Fourier transform-based algo-
rithms (see Thayer et al., 2008). We obtained high frequency
HRV power which primarily reflects vagal influences using
autoregressive estimates. Time domain indices included esti-
mates of root mean square successive difference in millisec-
onds (RMSSD) and HR in beats per minute. For spectral
analyses, we used autoregressive estimates following the Task
Force of the European Society of Cardiology and the North
American Society of Pacing Electrophysiology (1996) guidelines.
Results
Manipulation check. We first ensured that participants perceived
congruent and incongruent dilemmas differently (Conway and
Gawronski, 2013). Replicating previous results, participants
judged harmful actions in the incongruent dilemmas
(M¼ 54.8%, s.d.¼ 17.0) as significantly more acceptable than the
congruent dilemmas (M¼ 20.5%, s.d.¼ 14.5), t(63)¼ 17.06,
P< 0.01, d¼ 2.17. Participants further took longer to read and re-
spond to incongruent (M¼ 41.8 s, s.d.¼ 13.3) than congruent di-
lemmas (M¼ 33.2%, s.d.¼ 14.5), t(63)¼ 7.90, P < 0.01, d¼ 0.78,
and rated it more difficult to answer incongruent (M¼ 3.19,
s.d.¼ 0.85) than congruent ones (M¼ 2.50, s.d.¼ 0.82),
t(63)¼8.47, P < 0.01, d¼ 0.81. These analyses validated the dis-
tinction between congruent and incongruent dilemmas.
Traditional analysis. Following previous work (Conway and
Gawronski, 2013), we calculated the proportion of judging
outcome-based actions as inappropriate on incongruent moral
dilemmas and obtained traditional scores of deontology vs utili-
tarianism. Higher values indicate stronger deontological ten-
dencies, whereas lower values indicate stronger utilitarian
tendencies. The traditional bipolar deontology-utilitarianism
index was positively correlated with HRV (RMSSD; r¼ 0.24,
P ¼ 0.054), indicating that lower HRV was associated with higher
utilitarian tendencies.3
Research also reported that gender is a predictor of moral di-
lemma judgments (Friesdorf et al., 2015). The relationship be-
tween the traditional bipolar deontology-utilitarianism and
RMSSD (HRV) was then subjected to a first-order partial correl-
ation in order to explore the relationship controlling for the ef-
fect of gender. The first-order correlation was found to be
statistically significant for the traditional bipolar deontology-
utilitarianism index, r(61)¼ 0.27, P < 0.03, indicating that a
relationship between HRV and utilitarian tendencies exists after
adjusting for the effect of gender (Table 1).
The traditional bipolar deontology-utilitarianism index
was also positively correlated with the need for cognition
(r¼ 0.31, P < 0.02). However, we did not observe a correlation be-
tween the deontology-utilitarianism index and any other meas-
ures, such as religiosity, faith in intuition, empathetic concern,
perspective-taking, and moral identity internalization
(P’s> 0.16).
PD analysis. To help disentangle the relationship between
cardiac vagal tone and moral judgment, we calculated inde-
pendent estimates of deontology and utilitarianism using PD
(Conway and Gawronski, 2013). First, the respective probabil-
ities of rejecting harm in congruent and incongruent dilemmas
were calculated for each participant. The utilitarian score was
obtained by Equation (5) (see P. 10), which subtracts the prob-
ability of rejecting harm in incongruent dilemmas from the
probability of rejecting harm in congruent dilemmas. The de-
ontological score was obtained by Equation (6) (see p. 10), which
divides the probability of rejecting harm in incongruent di-
lemmas by the difference between one and utilitarian param-
eter (1  utilitarian parameter).
Replicating previous results (Conway and Gawronski, 2013),
the deontology parameter was positively correlated with the
traditional bipolar index of moral judgment (r¼ 0.75, P< 0.01),
Table 1. Correlations between traditional bipolar deontology vs utili-
tarianism scores, process dissociation deontology scores, process
dissociation utilitarianism scores and individual difference variables
Variable Traditional
score
PD
deontology
PD
utilitarian
RMSSD
(HRV)
Traditional score 0.75* 0.62* 0.24*
PD deontology 0.75* 0.03 0.02
PD utilitarian 0.62* 0.03 0.34*
RMSSD (HRV) 0.24* 0.02 0.34*
DUREL (religiosity) 0.20 0.35* 0.04 0.06
Need for cognition 0.31* 0.24 0.2 0.03
Faith in intuition 0.02 0.24 0.23 0.08
Empathic concern 0.23 0.37* 0.05 0.18
Perspective-taking 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.06
Moral identity
internalization
0.05 0.06 0.09 0.14
PD, process dissociation; RMSSD, root mean square successive difference in
milliseconds; HRV, heart rate variability; DUREL, the Duke University Religion
Index.
*P <0.05.
3 We also conducted a correlation analysis between the traditional bipo-
lar deontology-utilitarianism index and pNN50, another measure of
vagally mediated HRV. Consistent with RMSSD data, the traditional bi-
polar deontology-utilitarianism index was positively correlated with
pNN50 (r ¼ 0.31, P ¼ 0.012), indicating that lower HRV was associated
with higher utilitarian tendencies.
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whereas the utilitarian parameter was negatively correlated
with the traditional bipolar index (r¼0.62, P< 0.01). However,
the utilitarian and deontological parameters were not correlated
(r¼ 0.03, P¼ 0.83), suggesting that they should be treated as in-
dependent constructs. Also replicating the previous results
(Conway and Gawronski, 2013), the deontology parameter was
positively correlated with religiosity (r¼ 0.35, P< 0.01) and em-
pathetic concern (r¼ 0.37, P< 0.01).
We tested the hypothesis that lower resting HRV, which re-
flects weaker neural and visceral integration, would be associ-
ated with strong outcome-based, utilitarian moral judgments.
HRV (RMSSD) was indeed negatively correlated with the utilitar-
ian parameter (r¼0.34, P< 0.01),4 suggesting that lower car-
diac vagal tone is associated with stronger utilitarian
tendencies (see Figure 2).
To further analyze the relationship between the PD param-
eters and the individual difference variables, we conducted lin-
ear regression analyses. Confirming the results of the
correlation analyses, the utilitarian parameter was associated
with HRV, whereas the deontology parameter was associated
with religiosity and empathetic concern (see Table 2). However,
the deontology parameter was not associated with HRV
(r¼ 0.02, P ¼ 0.90).5 In sum, replicating previous results, the
traditional bipolar index was positively correlated with deonto-
logical and negatively with the utilitarian parameter. More im-
portantly, lower cardiac vagal tone was correlated with stronger
utilitarian tendencies, but not deontological tendencies.
Discussion
In the current research, we utilized cardiac vagal tone to evalu-
ate the functional integration of neural and visceral systems
involved in moral judgment. We investigated the relationship
between cardiac vagal tone and moral judgment using a
mix of moral dilemmas, mathematical modeling and
psychophysiological measures. We found that lower resting
HRV was correlated with stronger outcome-based, utilitarian in-
clinations, suggesting that strong utilitarian moral judgments
are associated with poor neuro-visceral integration. This re-
search provides evidence that cardiac vagal tone may be associ-
ated with the integration of visceral responses into moral
judgments, potentially via the vmPFC. When people lack the
ability to integrate visceral reactions, they might have a ten-
dency to base their moral judgments solely on outcomes, lead-
ing to utilitarian responses (Carmona-Perera et al., 2013).
Our results suggest that utilitarian judgments are associated
with a lack of neuro-visceral integration. Cardiac vagal tone is a
hallmark of the ability of the body to respond to the demands of
the situation. In particular, cardiac vagal tone is linked to the
ability to regulate the parasympathetic influence on the heart to
optimally respond to changes in circumstance by modifying
arousal, HR and attention (Porges, 1995). In line with this idea,
individuals high in cardiac vagal tone have, for example, better
cognitive and autonomic flexibility (Hansen et al., 2003; Park
et al., 2013c), higher ability to inhibit dominate responses (Park
et al., 2012b; Johnsen et al., 2003), and are better to regulate
negative facial expressions (Park et al., 2012a; Quintana et al.,
2012). The ability to react adaptively might also underlie the re-
lationship between cardiac vagal tone and positive emotions in
daily life and social connectedness (Kok and Fredrickson, 2010).
For moral judgments, we find that lower vagal tone is associ-
ated with utilitarian tendencies. This suggests that the capacity
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Fig. 2. A scatterplot indicating a negative correlation between heart rate variability (HRV) (x-axis) and the utilitarian parameter derived from process dissociation (PD)
(y-axis). r¼0.34, P< 0.01.
Table 2. Results of multiple regression analyses regressing individ-
ual difference variables onto process dissociation deontology and
process dissociation utilitarianism scores
PD deontology PD utilitarian
Variable b t P b t P
HRV 0.02 0.13 0.90 0.34 2.84 0.01
DUREL 0.35 2.74 0.01 0.04 0.32 0.75
Need for cognition 0.24 1.85 0.07 0.20 1.51 0.14
Empathic concern 0.37 2.92 0.01 0.05 0.37 0.72
PD, process dissociation; HRV, heart rate variability; DUREL, the Duke University
Religion Index.
4 When we used pNN50, a consistent result was found, (r¼0.43, P <
0.01). The first-order correlation was found to be statistically signifi-
cant for the PD utilitarian parameter, r(61)¼0.34, P < 0.01, after ad-
justing for gender.
5 When we used pNN50, a consistent result was found (r ¼ 0.03, P ¼
0.85).
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to integrate visceral reactions with the central nervous system
might moderate utilitarian tendencies.
Dual process theories of moral judgments argue that utilitar-
ian responses are driven by deliberative reasoning and have
been favored to be more rational moral judgments (Greene et al.,
2008; see also Feinberg et al., 2012). However, growing research
has reported that utilitarian moral judgments are associated
with antisocial traits, such as primary psychopathy, rational
egoism, and explicit amoral and self-centered judgments
(Bartels and Pizarro, 2011; Kahane et al., 2015). Here, we provide
additional evidence showing that utilitarian inclinations are
associated with lower abilities to integrate visceral responses
into moral judgment. Interestingly, it has been reported that
people with antisocial and psychopathic traits—who are char-
acterized by deficits in such pro-social traits—have lower car-
diac vagal tone (Raine, 1997; Hansen et al., 2007). These findings
cast further doubt on whether utilitarian moral judgments in
standard dilemmas should be considered the optimal responses
to these dilemmas.
Furthermore, there is a growing concern that dominant re-
search in moral psychology may not accurately capture the
philosophical view of utilitarianism (Kahane et al., 2015).
Utilitarian moral judgments typically observed in hypothetical
moral dilemmas—which often reflects one’s willingness to
harm or sacrifice few individuals in an attempt to save more
people—may not correspond to the philosophical view of
utilitarianism—which highlights an impartial concern for the
greater good (Kahane et al., 2015). In fact, recent research has
failed to find the direct relationship between utilitarian judg-
ments in the hypothetical moral dilemmas and a wide range of
traits, attitudes, judgment and behaviors that reflect an impar-
tial concern for the greater good (Kahane et al., 2015). This new
emerging perspective calls for further research to understand
the nature of the relationship between cardiac vagal tone and
strong utilitarian tendencies defined by a philosophical view—
that is an impartial concern for the greater good.
Previous research often characterized deontological re-
sponses as lacking flexibility (Greene, 2008). In line with this re-
search, we predicted that deontological moral judgments are
largely dependent on visceral responses, which do not require
neuro-visceral integration. And indeed we did not find any rela-
tionship between cardiac vagal tone and deontological judg-
ments. Deontological judgments may be better associated with
physiological indicators sensitive to sympathetic nervous sys-
tems, such as vasoconstriction/total peripheral resistance or
skin conductance (Mendes et al., 2007), which then lead directly
to action-based moral judgments.
Conclusion
The current research provides initial evidence that low cardiac
vagal tone is related to outcome-based, utilitarian judgments.
The results suggest that neuro-visceral integration may be an
important element of moral judgments. Outcome-based judg-
ments seem to involve the integration of visceral reactions into
their moral judgments in conjunction with pre-frontal regions.
This form of integration might help individuals move beyond
simple outcome-based, utilitarian judgments.
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